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Abstract:
Purpose: The paper concerns competition of  different transportation modes coexist in inter-
city transportation corridor. The purpose of  this paper is to express the competitive
relationship by building mathematical model and obtain the best sharing rate and the optimal
ticket price of  different transportation modes.
Design/methodology/approach: Firstly, analyzing influencing factors of  passenger choice
about transportation modes, we designed a utility function of  transportation modes. Secondly,
referring to the game theory and logit modle, a non-cooperative game model between railway
and highway was built. Finally, the model was applied to Nanchang-Jiujiang transportation
corridor in China for an empirical analysis. 
Findings: The results indicate that the proposed non-cooperative game model is rational and
reliable, and it supplies a scientific method to determine the optimal ticket price and passenger
sharing rate of  different transportation modes, and can be applied to the competition study on
different transportation modes in inter-city transportation corridor.
Originality/value: The main contribution of  this paper is to built the non-cooperative game
model, which can consider the needs of  different travelers, and achieve reasonable passenger
divergence of  different transportation modes and coordinated development of  whole
transport market.
Keywords: transportation corridor, game model, sharing rate, ticket price
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1. Introduction
Transportation corridor is a kind of transportation belt, composed of multiple parallel transport
lines of various transportation modes, and connected to a series of economic points,
production points and important cities. As the main transportation modes of passengers travel
from one city to another in urban agglomeration, transportation corridor has the relatively
stable customers and active consumer demand. It has been the main source of profits and
becomes the business focus of passenger transport business operators (Wu, 2011). With the
stable improvement of people's consumption level, people has higher requirement to the
service level of travel mode. Except for arriving at destination safely, the other demands, such
as economy, quickness, convenience and comfort, is also higher and higher gradually. How to
gain market share in greatest degree, so as to obtain the maximum benefit in the market, is
the focus of passenger transport operators. 
There are mainly four kinds of transportation mode, railway, highway, aviation, and waterways,
adopted by passengers when they travel (Roman, Espino & Martin, 2007). Railway and
highway is leading modes of passenger transportation in inter-city transportation corridor with
the distance of one or two hundred kilometers. Especially in recent years, with overall
construction and rapid ascension of operation level of passenger railway line in China,
competition between highway and railway is becoming more intense. However, due to their
own characteristics, the two transportation modes cannot replace each other. Therefore, in
order to share the passenger volume reasonably, improve the transportation capacity, and
provide better services for passengers, the reasonable structure of passenger transportation
should be studied. 
Aiming at the various transportation modes in the transportation market, experts at home and
abroad have conducted in-depth research on passenger sharing results and benefit influence
when making competitive strategies. For example, Sato analyzed travel choices of passengers
by using multinomial logit model, then got an optimal pricing method. Furthermore, a dynamic
pricing model with revenue management as the goal was given, in the model, passengers are
setting to choose from various transportation modes, and schedules of transportation modes
are setting to change dynamically (Sato & Katsushige, 2012). Chang proposed a model based
on the time value, which is used to calculate the passenger sharing rate of high-speed railway
in the market competition. In this model, the author holds that high-speed railway, aviation,
traditional railway and highway constitute a time space network in a comprehensive
transportation corridor, they compete with each other, finally reach the equilibrium (Chang &
Chang, 2004). In the perspective of microeconomics, Adler constructed a two-stage Nash
game model, which can be used to calculate the optimal equilibrium (Aldler, 2001).
In domestic, He chose five factors of price, speed, convenience, safety and comfort, used logit
model to analyze sharing rate of each mode transportation in the passenger transportation
corridor, besides, combined with the five factors, generalized payoff function was established,
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and maximum likelihood method was adopted, then the numerical value of each parameter
was ascertained. Finally, the accuracy of the model was verified by the competition instance of
transportation modes between Beijing and Taiyuan (He et al, 2006). With technical feature and
economic characteristics of transportation modes in the transportation corridor as a starting
point, Beijing to Shanghai as the representative of medium distance of transportation high-
speed railway, Dai drew a conclusion that when the price of high-speed railway position in 0.4
yuan/km, it has a strong competitiveness. Moreover, starting from factors that affecting
passenger travel, the article established logit sharing model, firstly calculated passenger
sharing rate only considering highway and civil aviation, then established sharing model after
high-speedway joins in. Eventually, the impact of high-speed railway to the civil aviation and
highway transportation is proved (Dai, 2009).
In the research field of pricing strategy modle and algorithm about co-opetition relationship of
transportation modes, based on the co-opetition relationship between high-speed railway and
traditional railway from Taipei to Kaohsiung, Chiung proposed a model called cyclic coordinate
ascent method, and got the MRT pricing strategy from Taipei to Kaohsiung (Chiung, Lee & Liao,
2010). Considering the constraints of capacity resource and the minimization of travelers’
generalized cost, Yang proposed bi-level planning model of market share, and designed
heuristic algorithm to solve the model (Yang & Bell, 1997). Lo utilized three-tier Nested Logit
model to analyze selection process of multimode public transportation network, in addition,
considering passengers’ transfer behaviors and nonlinear cost structure, the model was used to
analyze competitive revenue status of different enterprises (Lo, Yip & Wan, 2014). 
In domestic, in order to make reasonable passenger ticket price of railway, Fan built a bi-level
planning model. The lower planning is on the basis of wardrop equilibrium principle, which can
ensure passengers choose the transportation mode with the minimum generalized travel cost,
while the upper planning makes the maximum economic benefits of passenger department as
the goal. Afterward, difference method was adopted to solve the model, it provides a basis for
establishing reasonable passenger ticket price after the speed-up of railway (Fan & Zhu, 2004).
By analyzing the balance between supply and demand of the transportation market, Si
established multi-mode equilibrium assignment model between cities, used sensitivity analysis
method to solve equilibrium assignment problem of multi-mode transportation networks, then
illustrated the relationship between passenger volume and passenger ticket price of different
transportation modes, and analyzed the impact generated by change of passenger volume on
revenue of railway (Si & Gao, 2013). Based on the analysis of competitive environment in
medium and long distance passenger market, Ma made a reasonable division between existing
passenger railway lines and high speed passenger railway lines. Taking the minimum
generalized cost and maximum profit as the goal, multiple nested bi-level planning model was
established, moreover, the rationality of the genetic algorithm in solving multi-level planning
problems was discussed (Ma & Li, 2006). In the perspective of realistic transportation
environment, referring to the actual survey data of passengers’ travel, taking the factors of
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transportation supplies, passenger demand and market environment as start point, Guo
established a game model of high iron and civil aviation with the objective of maximizing social
profits, and derived Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution (Guo, 2010). Using the game theory in
economics, Zhang built passenger game competition model of different transportation modes
in the transportation corridor, afterward, based on the equilibrium solution, made
corresponding analysis on the superiority or inferiority of passenger transportation corridor
(Zhang & Zhao, 2012). 
On the basis of existing research results, this paper makes a comprehensive consideration
about the supply difference factor of transportation modes, the influence factor of passenger
travel, and the external market environment factor of passenger transportation, then analyzes
dynamic game relationship between operators of different transportation modes, as well as
between operators and passengers, furthermore, aiming at various transportation modes in the
passenger transportation corridor, studies the influence of different price strategies made by
different operators on final passenger sharing rate. Taking Nangchang-Jiujiang corridor for
example, non-cooperative Stackelberg double-deck game model on competition strategy
choice is build. Thus, game balance point can be determined to achieve the overall
optimization of passenger transportation structure and maximize the benefits. In addition, this
paper can provide a basis for different transportation enterprises to improve service level and
competitive ability and the government to control transportation structure in macroscopic
scale.
2. Analysis of Passenger Travel Mode Influence Factors
Passengers should choose a transportation mode or a combination of several kinds of mode
before they travel, so as to help them complete travel (Martin et al., 2014). They would
consider their properties, then calculate cost about traveling by different transportation modes,
finally they can choose the transportation mode with the minimum cost and access to
maximize the benefit. Therefore, demand factors reflect on the weights determined by
passengers of various types when they choose transportation modes in terms of products
supply difference (Uchida & Sugiki, 2013).
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Figure 1. Hierarchical structure of passenger travel influence factors
Factors of supply difference embodied by features of transportation modes, is essentially the
regulatory mastered by operators. With the purpose of adapting to the change of market
demand better and faster, operators commonly take measures by adjusting the resources most
easy to change (Zhou, 2012). With expert analysis, assuming passengers choose the
transportation mode which can bring them biggest benefit. Taking it as the goal, using analytic
hierarchy process, this paper establishes hierarchical structure model including objective layer,
criterion layer and scheme layer. Factors of supply difference will be simplified to five factors,
which are economy, timeliness, comfort, safety and convenience (Figure 1). Economy mainly
refers to the cost of the ticket in the corridor. Timeliness mainly refers to the length of travel
time, including traveling time and waiting time. Comfort mainly includes the passenger room
size, service quality, and space environment. Safety mainly refers to passenger's personal
safety and luggage safety. Convenience includes the convenience of booking tickets,
transferring and waiting.
3. Establishment of Non-Cooperative Game Model
3.1. Determination of Game Players
In the light of the characteristics of transportation modes in inter-city transportation corridor
(Zhou & Huang, 2013), inter-city high-speed railway and expressway are ascertained to be the
game players.
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3.2 Analysis of Game Strategy Sets
According to the main factors that influence passengers’ choices of travel modes in section 2,
business operators of passenger transportation can take corresponding strategies (Zhao,
2012):
• Economy strategy, means adjusting the price of tickets;
• Timeliness strategy, includes changing stops and routes, and adjusting vehicles’ speed
and transport organization plan;
• Comfort strategy, includes transferring, renovating and updating stations, raising the
service level of crews;
• Safety strategy, includes arranging safety education for employees, adjusting safety
facilities of vehicles or station, adjust ing the number of security personnel;
• Convenience strategy, includes adjusting the number of the ticket window, adjusting the
number of bus connection lines, adjusting station equipment and refitting vehicle.
3.3. Establishment of the Model
• Construction of sharing rate model with double-deck goals
The nether goal:
Y ik=X i1E k+X i2T k+X i3C k+X i 4Sk+X i 5Bk (1)
In the formula, Yik represents utility value of the i transportation mode for the kind of
passengers. Ek, Tk, Ck, Sk, Bk represent eigen value of economy, timeliness, comfort,
safety and convenience of the k transportation mode. Xin(n=1,2,3,4,5) represent weight
value of economy, timeliness, comfort, safety and convenience for the i(n=1,2,3,4) kind
of passengers. 
Supposing E is the game variable. According to the difference of value about E, the
biggest utility value should be selected as the optimal decision of passengers. At the
same time, we achieved the optimal solution for passengers as the gamer in the nether
model.
• The upper goal: firstly calculating passenger volume and share rate. Based on the utility
value of transportation modes, which has been calculated in the nether model, the
model of logit can be used to calculating passenger capacity and sharing rate.
Qk=∑
i
Q ik ,Q ik=Qk·P ik ,P ik=
eθ Y ik
eθ Y id+eθ Y ib
(2)
In the formula, k represents the k transportation mode, q represents eigen coefficient,
Qk and Pk represent passenger volume and sharing rate of the k transportation mode
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respectively, d represents inter-city high-speed railway, b represents expressway, Qik
represents passenger volume of the k transportation mode for the i kind of passengers. 
Calculating Earnings: earnings of transportation modes is decided by passenger volume
and ticket price. Because the paper studies the passenger transportation sharing rate
under the existing traffic facilities, we assume that passenger volume does not change
over the time. Earnings of transportation mode is as follows,
Rd=Qd Cd ,Rb=QbC b,Qr=QbQd (3)
In the formula, R represents earnings, Cb and Cd represents ticket price of expressway
and intercity high-speed Railway.
• Optimal decision analysis of each stage 
Because of the ticket price of Railway is stable, while the ticket price of highway is
relatively easy to change, we make such a hypothesis: firstly inter-city high-speed
railway makes its ticket price, then expressway decides its ticket price in terms of inter-
city high-speed railway. Analyze as follows by the converse illation method:
The second stage is the choice of expressway. It makes decisions in view of Cd
0 , the
ticket price of inter-city high-speed railway, make its price of Cb
✳ , which is the optimal
ticket price for expressway under the price of Cd
0 . That can be recorded as Cb
✳/C d
0 , and
at the same time, earnings of expressway can be recoded as Rb(C b
✳ /Cd
0) .
Return to analysis of the first stage. By reason of inter-city high-speed railway knows
the decision-making method of expressway, which makes the ticket price of Cb
✳ and
obtain maximum income of Rb. In order to achieve the best earnings of Rd (Cb
✳/C d
✳ ) ,
intercity high-speed railway should select the optimal ticket price of Cd
✳ . According to
the above steps, two inequalities can be drawn as follows:
Rd (Cb
✳/C d
✳ )Rd(C b
✳ /Cd) (4)
Rd (Cb
✳/C d
✳ )Rd(C b/Cd
✳ ) (5)
When the two inequality were established at the same time, Cb
✳/C d
✳ must be the
equilibrium solutions of this game, which is so-called Nash equilibrium. Both sides of the
game will get maximum satisfaction at the moment.
• Establishment of bi-matrix game model
Based on the expression of competitive situation in game theory, bi-matrix game model
is established:
G=<(b,d),(Xb,Xd),(Rb,Rd)> (6)
In the formule, Xb and Xd stand for strategy sets of inter-city high-speed railway and
expressway respectively. Rb and Rd represent earnings of both transportation modes.
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• Set conditions of the optimal solutions
The optimal solutions may be set as the following. 
• Satisfaction on ticket price of both sides can reach maximum value, satisfaction
of inter-city high-speed railway must be 1, and expressway reach maximum
value.
• Ticket price of both sides can maximize the whole profit including transportation
modes and passengers. 
Satisfaction refers to another mode obtains satisfaction degree of profit, while fixing the
price of one mode. Definition shows as formule (7):
V k
j (C−k
j )=
Rk (Ck
j ,C−k
j )
max
i=1,2,. .. ,m
(Rk(Ck
j , C−k
j )) (7)
In the formula, k values for b and d, while -k on behalf of the opponent of k. V k
j (C−k
j )
represents satisfaction degree of k with the price of Ck
i , when the opponent make price
strategy of C−k
i . If it achieves the optimal solution, we can get the formule (8):
V b(Cb
✳ /C d
✳ )+vd(C b
✳ /Cd
✳ )= max
i=1,2,. ..,m
j=1,2,. ..n
(V b(Cb
i /Cd
j )+V d(C b
i /C d
j )) (8)
In addition, Rb(C b
✳ /Cd
✳)+Rd(C b
✳ /Cd
✳) reach the maximum, which is the optimal solution of
modle. Then we can calculate the optimal share rate of both transportation modes, rb and
rd, under the current resources, rb and rd represent the proportion of passengers about
expressway and inter-city high-speed railway when they travel.
rb=Qb
✳ /Q , rd=Qd
✳ /Q (9)
In the formule, Qb
✳ , Qd
✳ represent passenger volume of expressway and inter-city high-
speed railway under the condition of optimal solution.
4. Empirical Analysis
Nanchang-Jiujiang transportation corridor is make up of multiple parallel transport lines
(including the various transportation facilities, such as terminal, and so on) of various
transportation modes, connecting cities of Nanchang and Jiujiang.The major lines are Beijing-
Kowloon Railwayway, Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed Railway, Nanchang-Jiujiang
Expressway, 105 National Rd, 316 National Rd, Ganjiang waterway. This paper mainly studies
on competitive game between Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed Railway and Nanchang-
Jiujiang Expressway.
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4.1. Passenger Flow Analysis of Transport Corridor
It will comparatively reflect individual requirements for transport demand direct ly and
effectively by structure of economic level. Refer to Nanchang statistic yearbook of 2013
(Statistics Bureau of Jiangxi Provincial, 2013), passenger flow can be divided into four classes.
And then questionnaire should be designed to survey on economic structure of passengers in
Nanchang-Jiujiang transport corridor. Shows in Table 1. 
Classification of
passenger flow
Resident income
(yuan/month) Proportion
Low income <1,300 19.46%
Middle income 1,300~3,500 37.21%
Higher income 3,500~5,500 31.25%
High income >5,500 12.08%
Table 1. Economic structure of passengers in Nanchang-Jiujiang transport corridor
4.2. Calculating Eigenvalues of Transportation Modes
Property difference of two kinds of transportation modes can be reflected by the influence
factors of passengers when they travel, which are the five factors, economy, timeliness,
comfort, safety and convenience. In order to quantify the above factors, ticket price, travel
time, operational stability, accident rate and transfer promptness are adopted to represent the
factors respectively. Through the contrastive analysis and normalization processing, we can get
eigenvalues of inter-city high-speed railway and expressway.
Transportation mode Ticketprice
Travel 
time
Operational
stability
Accident 
rate
Transfer
promptness
Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city 
High-speed Railway 0.48 0.56 0.72 0.67 0.35
Nanchang-Jiujiang Expressway 0.52 0.44 0.28 0.33 0.65
Table 2. Eigenvalues of the two kinds of transportation modes in Nanchang-Jiujiang
transportation corridor
4.3. Calculation of Influence Factors’ Weights
On the basis of classification of passengers in section 4.2., we designed questionnaire of
passenger preference to influence factors when they travel. One thousand questionnaires were
issued at Nanchang Railwayway Station, Nanchang West Railwayway Station, Jiujiang
Railwayway Station, and in colleges, enterprises, institutions in the two cities. Finally get 987
effective questionnaires. After systemizing questionnaires and data analysis, we figured up
weight vectors of influence factors for four kinds of passengers based on economic structure by
hierarchical analysis software of yaahp. The weight vector is reprensented by W.
W1=(0.32,0.21,0.16,0.14,0.17)
T W2=(0.27,0.23,0.17,0.15,0.18)
T
W3=(0.22,0.27,0.19,0.17,0.15)
T W4=(0.16,0.30,0.22,0.14,0.18)
T
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4.4. Solution Process of the Game Model
On the basis of survey data, eigen coefficient is achieved to 12.7 by fitting. The total
passenger flow is noted for 1 in Nanchang-Jiujiang transportation corridor. According to
formulas of (1) and (2), the present share rate of Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed
Railway is 72.45 percent, while Nanchang-Jiujiang Expressway is 27.55 percent. In order to
obtain the optimal sharing rate and make the best pricing strategy, the modle in chapter 3
should be caculated as follows:
• According to the respective characteristics and restriction conditions(such as policy and
cost) of the two transportation modes, combined with the analysis of strategy sets in
section 3.2., the ticket price fluctuation range of Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-
speed Railway can be setted by 20 percent, and Nanchang-Jiujiang Expressway 10
percent. 
• On the basis of formula (2), the sharing rates of Pb(C b
i /Cd
j ) and Pd (Cb
i /Cd
j ) can be
acquired as shown in Table 3 and Table 4. In accordance with the corresponding ticket
price of Rb(C b
i /Cd
j) and Rd (Cb
i /C d
j ) , under sharing rates, pay-off matrixes of Ab and Ad can
be calculated and gotten. Shows in Table 5 and Table 6.
Inter-city
high-speed
railway
31.5 33.5 35.5 37.5 39.5 41.5 43.5 45.5 47.5
34 0.7605 0.7431 0.7274 0.7025 0.6837 0.6654 0.6420 0.6197 0.5976
35.5 0.7822 0.7652 0.7462 0.7232 0.7028 0.6873 0.6638 0.6372 0.6181
37 0.8078 0.7844 0.7633 0.7427 0.7245 0.7062 0.6829 0.6614 0.6342
38.5 0.8264 0.8097 0.7863 0.7640 0.7419 0.7265 0.7055 0.6825 0.6574
41 0.8513 0.8232 0.8027 0.7838 0.7614 0.7403 0.7242 0.7068 0.6712
Table 3. Sharing rate of Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed Railway
Expressway 31.5 33.5 35.5 37.5 39.5 41.5 43.5 45.5 47.5
34 0.2395 0.2569 0.2726 0.2975 0.3163 0.3346 0.358 0.3803 0.4024
35.5 0.2178 0.2348 0.2538 0.2768 0.2972 0.3127 0.3362 0.3628 0.3819
37 0.1922 0.2156 0.2367 0.2573 0.2755 0.2938 0.3171 0.3386 0.3658
38.5 0.1736 0.1903 0.2137 0.236 0.2581 0.2735 0.2945 0.3175 0.3426
41 0.1487 0.1768 0.1973 0.2162 0.2386 0.2597 0.2758 0.2932 0.3288
Table 4. Sharing rate of Nanchang-Jiujiang Expressway
Inter-city high-
speed railway 31.5 33.5 35.5 37.5 39.5 41.5 43.5 45.5 47.5
34 23.96 24.89 25.82 26.34 27.01 27.61 27.93 28.20 28.39 
35.5 24.64 25.63 26.49 27.12 27.76 28.52 28.88 28.99 29.36 
37 25.45 26.28 27.10 27.85 28.62 29.31 29.71 30.09 30.12 
38.5 26.03 27.12 27.91 28.65 29.31 30.15 30.69 31.05 31.23 
41 26.82 27.58 28.50 29.39 30.08 30.72 31.50 32.16 31.88 
Table 5. Operating earnings of Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed Railway
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Expressway 31.5 33.5 35.5 37.5 39.5 41.5 43.5 45.5 47.5
34 8.14 8.73 9.27 10.12 10.75 11.38 12.17 12.93 13.68 
35.5 7.73 8.34 9.01 9.83 10.55 11.10 11.94 12.88 13.56 
37 7.11 7.98 8.76 9.52 10.19 10.87 11.73 12.53 13.53 
38.5 6.68 7.33 8.23 9.09 9.94 10.53 11.34 12.22 13.19 
41 6.10 7.25 8.09 8.86 9.78 10.65 11.31 12.02 13.48 
Table 6. Operating earnings of Nanchang-Jiujiang Expressway
• Satisfaction degree of both transportation modes, V b(Cb
i /C d
j ) and V d(C b
i /Cd
j ) , can be
obtained by the formula (7), as shown in Table 7 and Table 8. Then we can get
comprehensive satisfaction matrix of V, which is the sum of the satisfaction degree of
both transportation modes. Shows in Table 9.
Satisfaction 31.5 33.5 35.5 37.5 39.5 41.5 43.5 45.5 47.5
34 0.7879 0.8324 0.8798 0.8929 0.89015 0.9121 0.9413 0.9635 0.9840
35.5 0.8293 0.8578 0.9012 0.9246 0.9415 0.9597 0.9725 0.9928 1
37 0.8383 0.8735 0.8992 0.9234 0.9497 0.9670 0.9809 0.9952 1
38.5 0.7932 0.8311 0.8643 0.8964 0.9213 0.9434 0.9279 0.9525 0.9983
41 0.7718 0.8319 0.8584 0.8839 0.9082 0.9189 0.9344 0.9536 0.9728
Table 7. Satisfaction of Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed Railway
Satisfaction 31.5 33.5 35.5 37.5 39.5 41.5 43.5 45.5 47.5
34 0.7953 0.8302 0.8635 0.8968 0.92125 0.9331 0.9328 0.93 0.9388
35.5 0.8285 0.8666 0.8807 0.9218 0.9392 0.9566 0.9685 0.9705 0.9864
37 0.837 0.8673 0.9032 0.9299 0.9475 0.9659 0.9799 0.9964 1
38.5 0.7945 0.8292 0.8624 0.8942 0.9205 0.9428 1 1 0.9763
41 0.7703 0.8272 0.8556 0.8987 0.9229 0.9383 0.9415 0.9484 0.9546
Table 8. Satisfaction of Nanchang-Jiujiang Expressway
Satisfaction 31.5 33.5 35.5 37.5 39.5 41.5 43.5 45.5 47.5
34 1.5832 1.6626 1.7433 1.7897 1.8114 1.8452 1.8741 1.8935 1.9228
35.5 1.6578 1.7244 1.7819 1.8464 1.8807 1.9163 1.9410 1.9633 1.9864
37 1.6753 1.7408 1.8024 1.8533 1.8972 1.9329 1.9608 1.9916 2
38.5 1.5877 1.6603 1.7267 1.7906 1.8418 1.8862 1.9279 1.9525 1.9746
41 1.5421 1.6591 1.7140 1.7826 1.8311 1.8572 1.8759 1.9020 1.9274
Table 9. Overall satisfaction of Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed Railway and
Nanchang-Jiujiang Expressway
• Finding out the maximum of overall satisfaction, which can achieve entirety optimal.
The corresponding ticket price of Nanchang-Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed Railway is
47.5 yuan, and Nanchang-Jiujiang Expressway is 37 yuan. At the moment, the decision
is the game optimal solution of both transportation modes.
• Passenger volume of both transportation modes can be calculated through game
optimal solution. Based on the formula (9), the optimal sharing rate of Nanchang-
Jiujiang Inter-city High-speed Railway is 63.42 percent, while Nanchang-Jiujiang
Expressway is 36.58 percent under the current resources.
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4.5 Analysis of Result
The result is that inter-city high-speed railway should raise its ticket price from 39.5 yuan to
47.5 yuan and expressway should keep the present ticket price of 37 yuan. The sharing rate of
railway fell from 72.45% to 63.42%, while expressway increase from 27.55% to 36.58%. With
the respective earnings of 30.12 and 13.53, both railway and expressway obtain maximum
satisfaction. The sum of satisfaction gets to 2. At the moment, inter-city high-speed railway
and expressway gain maximum benefit, and reach Nash equilibrium of the game.
At the present game of the two transportation modes, Nanchang-Jiujiang Intercity High-Speed
Railway takes advantage of economy and timeliness, which are two main factors affecting
passenger to make a choice. It obtains passenger flow with a large proportion by the lower
ticket price and the faster speed. But for the high transportation cost and large passenger flow,
intercity high-speed railway does not get the best earnings and the biggest satisfaction (Yin,
2014; Zhu, 2014). On the contrary, despite of a reasonable pricing, Nanchang-Jiujiang
Expressway can’t obtain the more passenger flow and the best earnings under the present
pricing strategy of its opponent. In the current unreasonable and unstable state, game
equilibrium point should be sought for the best strategy of both sides. Under the point,
passengers who are more sensitive to ticket price and time may transfer from one
transportation mode to another in the corridor. Meanwhile, passengers who are less sensitive
to ticket price can prefer the transportation mode they like more expediently and easily. In this
way, it can make a reasonable allocation of passenger volume and obtain the optimal sharing
rate. Finally it can reach the biggest satisfaction and reach the game equilibrium of both
transportation modes. 
5. Conclusions
It can be seen that the conclusion of non-cooperative game model established in this paper
has a good consistent with the actual situation. It is helpful for the improvement of the inter-
city transportation corridor structure. In addition, it can provide better service quality for
passengers based on their various demands. The modle can be applied to game research on
two kinds of transportation modes. Based on the game analysis of Nanchang-Jiujiang
transportation corridor, some advices can be put forward to the inter-city transportation
corridor with short distance as follows: 
• From the view of transportation modes’ managers, they can adjust the proportion of
various transportation modes in transportation corridor by policy intervention, such as
control the pricing scope. It finally realizes reasonable divergence of passengers and
achieves coordinated development of the whole operation. 
• Owing to the relatively low price of inter-city high-speed railway, ticket price should be
raised appropriately. So part of the passenger flow can be transfered to expressway and
-1742-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1669
other transportation modes. To this, operating costs would be reduced, inter-city high-
speed railway may obtain a better earnings and greater satisfaction. 
• As the operators of expressway, their competitiveness can be enhanced by improving
the way of booking tickets, perfecting service facilities and promoting quality of service.
In such ways passengers that more sensitive to price can be attracted to expressway.
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